SUDAN
Escalation of violence in Al Fasher

ACAPS ANALYSIS HUB SUDAN

Briefing note
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CRISIS OVERVIEW

Following their takeover of Al Fasher on 26 October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have committed widespread mass atrocities against civilians (The Guardian 31/10/2025; SIHA 29/10/2025). Reports include mass killings, summary executions, mass detentions, kidnappings, and sexual violence, particularly targeting women and girls (Al-Monitor 02/11/2025; AJ 04/11/2025). There have also been reports of forced displacement, attacks on humanitarian workers, and the looting of civilian and community services, such as hospitals (OHCHR 31/10/2025; WHO 29/10/2025).

Reflecting patterns of violence witnessed throughout the conflict in Sudan, particularly in Darfur region, there have been widespread reports that during and following the takeover of Al Fasher, RSF fighters have systematically targeted specific ethnic and tribal groups with acts of violence that include summary executions, detentions, and rape (Insecurity Insight 20/05/2025; MSF 03/07/2025; BBC 31/10/2025). Targeted groups include the Zaghawa, Fur, Berti, Masalit, and potentially other Darfuris RSF consider non-Arab (SIHA 29/10/2025; YSPH HRL 27/10/2025).

The sudden escalation of violence has led to substantial displacement from Al Fasher, with an estimated 100,537 people displaced from the city and surrounding villages between 26 October and 17 November. By 5 November, about 6,000 people were reported to have arrived in Tawila, the main destination for people fleeing Al Fasher (IOM 17/11/2025; IRC 03/11/2025; AJ 05/11/2025). On 8 November, media reports updated the figure to 16,000, but these statistics remain unverified (AJ 08/11/2025; LA Times 08/11/2025). The relatively low numbers of IDP arrivals in places of displacement have raised concerns about the welfare of the tens of thousands of IDPs currently unaccounted for, particularly in light of media reports suggesting that RSF have been kidnapping civilians attempting to flee Al Fasher for ransom and executing those unable to secure payment (IRC 03/11/2025; AJ 05/11/2025).

The takeover and resulting violence come at a time of significant food insecurity in Al Fasher and other places to which people are fleeing, further threatening the health and wellbeing of affected populations. Famine (IPC Phase 5) conditions were confirmed in Al Fasher in September. These conditions are currently projected to continue through January 2026, with both Al Fasher and Tawila projected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity levels until May. These projections indicate expectations of very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality (IPC 03/11/2025; WFP 04/11/2025).

Anticipated scope and scale

In the coming two to three weeks, widespread insecurity and violence are expected to continue in and around Al Fasher as RSF fighters continue to target civilians and critical infrastructure. Severe access constraints are also likely to persist, with movement restrictions, telecommunication blackouts, and insecurity hampering both people's movement and the humanitarian response (OHCHR 31/10/2025; WHO 29/10/2025).

Internal displacement from Al Fasher is expected to continue as civilians flee violence, primarily towards Tawila and surrounding areas (IOM 11/11/2025; IRC 03/11/2025). Given continued reports of RSF kidnappings, abductions, and executions of civilians attempting to flee, however, displacement may remain highly constrained (AJ 05/11/2025). At the same time, there has been a notable spike in cross-border displacement into Chad, with at least 1,700 people crossing on 29 October 2025 alone (IOM 30/10/2025). Beyond the surge of movement towards Tawila and, to a lesser degree, Chad, South Sudan and the Central African Republic also continue to receive smaller but consistent flows of refugees and returnees from the wider Darfur conflict zone, straining their already critical humanitarian capacity (UNHCR accessed 14/11/2025; Africanews 20/10/2025). As violence intensifies, both internal (i.e. in-state and to other states) and cross-border displacement dynamics will likely continue to escalate, with speculations of rapidly shifting front lines towards Kordofan (ME Council on Global Affairs 10/11/2025).

The continued influx of IDPs into Tawila, already hosting over 650,000 IDPs, will aggravate existing severe shortages of food, shelter, water, and healthcare (IOM 29/10/2025; ST 21/10/2025). In Al Fasher, the combination of famine conditions, the looting of hospitals, and the collapse of essential services will likely worsen already dire humanitarian needs (IPC 03/11/2025; WHO 29/10/2025). In Tawila, overcrowding, overstretched facilities, and limited-service capacity mean that new arrivals are unlikely to access adequate assistance, further deepening the humanitarian crisis (SAPA 10/11/2025; IRC 27/10/2025). The fall of Al Fasher to RSF marks a major escalation in Sudan's conflict, giving RSF strategic control over Darfur and much of Kordofan (OHCHR 07/11/2025). This shift, alongside the involvement of international powers competing for Sudan's strategic resources, including gold, and its location linking the Red Sea and the Sahel, threatens to fuel regional instability and potential proxy wars (ICG 14/11/2025; PBS 07/11/2025).

Disclaimer
This is an updated version of a rapid analysis report initially published on 31 October 2025. ACAPS retracted the original report on 3 November in view of the rapidly changing and developing situation.

The strategic landscape of the war in Sudan has shifted following the events in Al Fasher, ushering in a new phase of conflict focusing on the Kordofan region (OHCHR 07/11/2025). Conflict is likely to intensify in key locations such as Al Obeid, Babanusa, Dilling, and Kadugli, forming a new front line (EUISS 04/11/2025). The conflict will likely follow the patterns established in Darfur, using siege tactics, coordinated ground assaults against strongholds of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and increased drone and artillery activity (Reuters 14/11/2025). For aid organisations, this intensification, combined with conflict parties' growing scrutiny, will severely constrain their ability to maintain crossline access, necessitating the immediate integration of these aggressive drone-use patterns into comprehensive risk assessments and planning (Amnesty International 05/11/2025).

CRISIS IMPACTS

Protection

Following RSF's takeover of Al Fasher on 26 October, the group has subjected civilians to widespread atrocities, including mass killings, summary executions, sexual violence (particularly targeting women and girls), mass detentions, and kidnappings and abductions (Al-Monitor 02/11/2025; AJ 04/11/2025). Access restrictions prevent data collection on the exact scale of these atrocities, but there has been satellite imagery of at least two earth disturbance patterns that may represent mass graves (YSPH HRL 04/11/2025).

The recent events represent a sharp uptick in protection violations committed against civilians in Al Fasher and surrounding areas since the start of the conflict. Between April 2023 and 24 October 2025, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data recorded around 400 incidents of violence against civilians, resulting in 1,400 deaths. The actual number of incidents is likely higher (ACLED 29/10/2025). Although the scale of the death toll since the takeover remains unknown, an unverified SAF report on 29 October put it at over 2,000, and this is expected to have continued rising since (Xinhua 29/10/2025). Reports from the media and human rights and humanitarian entities emphasise RSF's continued use of widespread, targeted violence against specific ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa, Fur, Berti, and Masalit, who have historically faced marginalisation, as well as people accused of aligning with SAF. For instance, there have been reports of RSF militia stopping groups fleeing Al Fasher and separating them by ethnicity, with men identified as belonging to the Zaghawa tribe being accused of affiliation with SAF and executed on the spot (SIHA 29/10/2025; AJ 05/11/2025).

Until 12 November, there remained extremely limited information on the safety and wellbeing of the vast majority of people understood to be living in Al Fasher prior to the takeover. On 9 November, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix estimated between 95,000–105,000 people remaining in Al Fasher, although information about their welfare is very scarce. Of the 100,537 IDPs estimated to have displaced from Al Fasher, only 6,000 are known to have reached Tawila, the main displacement destination for people displaced from Al Fasher since the takeover (IOM 17/11/2025; ABC 09/11/2025). On 8 November, media reports increased the number of arrivals to16,000, but these statistics remain unverified by the response. The very low number of men recorded to have arrived in Tawila has raised concerns that many have perished amid ethnically targeted violence in and around Al Fasher (MSF 28/10/2025).

There have been reports of kidnappings of IDPs attempting to flee Al Fasher, with RSF members demanding ransom from the families of affected people in exchange for their freedom. Failure to raise the ransom has resulted in executions (AJ 05/11/2025). RSF ransom and trafficking networks are understood to be operating along escape routes from Al Fasher, with their activity picking up in the days since the takeover (TNH 03/11/2025). RSF members have also been detaining civilians in school buildings and subjected those attempting to flee to violence. The scale is currently unknown, but anecdotal reports suggest hundreds of civilians affected (Al-Monitor 02/11/2025). Given the reported presence of unexploded ordnance and mines in North Darfur even before the takeover, the escalation in violence is likely to have increased the safety risk for the civilians left in Al Fasher and those fleeing (IOM 05/10/2025).

There are widespread reports of women and girls being exposed to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) when attempting to flee Al Fasher, including rape and gang rape. For instance, at least 25 women were gang-raped at gunpoint at a displacement shelter near Al Fasher University. While clinical management of rape services are available in Tawila, the relatively small number of IDPs arriving suggests that some survivors may not have access to these services, affecting their future health and wellbeing (UNFPA 05/11/2025; UN 31/10/2025). Since the start of the conflict, the involved parties – most notably RSF – have used CRSV to humiliate, dominate, and forcibly displace communities. This has been in the form of rape, gang rape, or sexual slavery, predominantly affecting women and girls, particularly those from targeted ethnic and Indigenous groups (Amnesty International 09/04/2025; UNGA 20/01/2025).

Women and girl IDPs able to reach displacement sites, such as Tawila and Al Dabbah, continue to face the threat of gender-based violence (GBV). Lack of shelter is forcing many families to sleep outside, while an insufficient number of latrines is pushing women and girls to look for secluded locations to preserve their privacy, including after dark. These conditions increase their exposure to protection risks, including violence and exploitation (UNFPA 05/11/2025).

The takeover of Al Fasher and resulting violence have also elevated protection risks for children, including the separation of children from caregivers and children's association with armed forces and groups. Although there is currently no reliable information on the use of child soldiers during the takeover and subsequent atrocities, before the takeover, RSF did mobilise thousands of fighters, including children, in preparation for attacking SAF's final strongholds in Darfur, specifically Al Fasher (Darfur24 28/10/2024). The association

of children with armed forces and groups has been observed in relation to all key conflict parties, particularly in Darfur region, and has long occurred even before the start of the 2023 escalation (SHRH 05/2024; DW 28/10/2025). It severely threatens affected children's physical and psychological safety and wellbeing (OSRSG CAAC accessed 12/11/2025). Furthermore, reports indicate the presence of unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) arriving in Tawila, with at least 170 identified, although the actual scale of this protection risk is likely higher (IRC 03/11/2025; UNICEF 06/11/2025).

Displacement

RSF's takeover of Al Fasher has triggered the significant displacement of more people from the town. Between 26 October and 17 November, over 100,537 people were displaced from Al Fasher to other areas, including Tawila. Around 75% of these had already experienced displacement during prior conflict escalations, such as the violence witnessed in Zamzam and Abu Shouk IDP camps (IOM 17/11/2025). Tawila is 70km away and a four-day trek from Al Fasher, making it challenging for IDPs, most of whom are without basic needs such as food and water, to reach humanitarian assistance. It is also particularly difficult for those who are pregnant or have acute or chronic health conditions. Along the way, fleeing civilians face severe risks, including reported attacks and incidents of people being burnt alive inside vehicles. The journey also poses a risk of exposure to opportunistic criminality, such as harassment and looting (STC 29/10/2025; UNHCR 28/10/2025; CARE 19/08/2025; AA 30/10/2025; UNFPA 05/11/2025).

Health

The violence committed during and since the takeover of Al Fasher has posed significant health risks to affected populations. IDPs are arriving in Tawila with acute health needs, mainly injuries such as gunshot wounds, fractures, and others linked to beatings and torture (MSF 03/11/2025). There are also reports of pregnant women, including those in the late stages of pregnancy, being forced to flee to escape the violence and having to walk long distances across harsh terrain (UNFPA 05/11/2025).

During the takeover, there has also been substantial damage to health infrastructure and the reported looting of supplies, reducing the availability of and access to live-saving services for civilians still in Al Fasher. During a single incident on 28 October, an RSF attack on the Saudi Maternity Hospital, the last partially operational hospital in Al Fasher, killed around 460 people, including patients and their companions (WHO 29/10/2025). Aside from this attack, the fourth on the hospital in the span of one month, there have also been reports of RSF fighters setting pharmacies on fire and engaging in the widespread looting of hospitals and health facilities, including stealing medication and medical supplies. This has greatly depleted what was left of the city's healthcare resources and infrastructure, including emergency care (WHO 29/10/2025; TNA 03/11/2025; AJ 28/10/2025). There have also been cases of attacks killing or involving the abduction of healthcare workers, with six abducted on 28 October (WHO 29/10/2025).

The depletion of healthcare infrastructure following the Al Fasher takeover comes at a time when healthcare services in Darfur are already vastly stretched owing to the conflict, food insecurity, and resulting malnutrition. In Al Fasher, the prolonged restriction of humanitarian access during the 500-day siege that affected the city beginning in April 2024 vastly impeded the delivery of life-saving items, including health supplies (UNICEF 26/08/2025; The Guardian 15/10/2025). This resulted in acute and widespread malnutrition, with health responders reporting extremely high levels of malnutrition among women and children IDPs arriving in Tawila after fleeing the violence in Al Fasher (MSF 28/10/2025).

Civilians remaining in Al Fasher are also at risk of the rapid spread of diseases, given a lack of safe water and sanitation provision. Before the escalation in violence, cholera was already spreading rapidly in the town because of limited access to safe drinking water and hygiene products. Insecurity has also hampered disease surveillance and response efforts, leading to approximately 272 suspected cases and 32 deaths in 2025 alone, with a markedly high case fatality rate (CFR) of 12% (WHO 29/10/2025). The current CFR substantially exceeds the standard indicator for adequate cholera case management of a CFR of less than 1%, indicating both a virulent outbreak and lack of access to standard cholera treatment protocols in Al Fasher (MSF accessed 31/10/2025).

In places of displacement, health needs are also stretched. For instance, Tawila Hospital is unable to cope with the current influx of health needs, which are expected to worsen as more people arrive (MSF 28/10/2025). The main illnesses reported are malaria (around 70%), acute respiratory infections (about 45%), and diarrhoea (around 27%), all of which are worsening with overcrowded conditions and limited vaccination services, which in some sites occur only once a week or less (SAPA 10/11/2025).

Mental health and psychosocial support

The violence and atrocities witnessed and experienced by affected civilians since the takeover of Al Fasher, coupled with the losses associated with displacement and, in some cases, the death of or separation from family members, are likely to have substantive impacts on community members' mental health and wellbeing. IDPs have been reported to experience severe psychological distress after enduring starvation and witnessing killings, rape, and the disappearance of their children during the takeover. There is mounting evidence that conflict parties are deliberately and systematically using rape as a weapon of war, and the violence

is also likely psychologically affecting men and boys (ACI Africa 11/11/2025; IMC 12/11/2025; UN 11/11/2025). The posting of images and videos of the atrocities on social media by RSF members also contributes to wider mental health impacts, including the risk of families learning about the deaths of their loved ones in that manner (AJ 29/10/2025).

These impacts come alongside other threats to affected populations' mental health since the conflict began that derive from experiencing or witnessing a plethora of violence. This prolonged exposure to conflict causes emotional stress, leading to potentially lifelong mental health and psychosocial issues, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and substance abuse (UNICEF 10/10/2024). These conditions may undermine people's capacity to care for themselves and their dependents. Prolonged economic hardship and insecurity have increased mental health needs among children and families, which the overstretched healthcare system has been unable to meet (WVI 08/2024).

Shelter and NFIs

Shelter and NFIs have emerged as priority needs for individuals remaining in Al Fasher and those actively being displaced from the city. Prior to the takeover, indiscriminate bombing from artillery assaults and aerial bombs had already extensively damaged or destroyed shelter structures within the town (CARE 20/08/2025). As recently as 14 October, satellite imagery revealed widespread damage and destruction among residential buildings, which have likely significantly worsened given the intensity of the violence since the takeover (Yale 14/10/2025; NAN 24/05/2024). People remaining in Al Fasher face limited shelter options, as those available are either overcrowded or damaged owing to neglect and targeting, including by shelling, risking collapse on inhabitants (ST 30/09/2025).

Civilians fleeing Al Fasher face limited shelter options, given that RSF have previously targeted neighbouring IDP camps and settlements, such as camps in Zamzam and Abu Shouk, while Tawila remains overcrowded (WHO 29/10/2025; Dabanga 13/02/2025). Widespread displacement and the targeting of civilians, leading to the loss or destruction of personal residences and belongings, coupled with the prolonged siege on Al Fasher, limit civilian access to NFIs, including blankets, medicine, and, in the case of women and girls, menstrual and dignity packages, further heightening unmet needs (Sudan Tribune 19/08/2025).

In Tawila, around 43% of people are living in collapsed or unsafe shelters, 98% lack basic sleeping materials, and 74% are living in informal gathering sites – conditions that increase overcrowding, exposure to the elements, and the risk of GBV (SAPA 10/11/2025). North Darfur is also currently in the latter stages of its rainy season (typically from June–November), exposing IDPs without adequate shelter and services. This, combined with the collapse of health services, risks the further spread of diseases such as malaria, cholera, and dengue fever (WHO 29/10/2025; UNFPA 28/10/2025).

Food insecurity

The city of Al Fasher has been cut off from humanitarian access, leaving people with no access to aid, including food aid, since the siege began in April 2024. This has seriously eroded food security. In November 2025, the IPC confirmed that IPC 5 conditions had been occurring in Al Fasher since September, with the current conditions expected to continue through January 2026. Projections also indicate IPC 4 conditions until at least May, suggesting that the situation is unlikely to improve significantly in the short term (IPC 03/11/2025). With food prices skyrocketing and purchasing power increasingly weakening, the IPC 5 classification means at least 20% of the households in Al Fasher extremely lack food and are facing starvation, resulting in extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition or death (IPC 10/2025). The majority of the communal kitchens that previously helped to fill some of the food gaps had closed by August 2025 after the siege caused supplies to run out (AJ 06/08/2025).

Because of the shortage of food aid reaching Al Fasher, people have had to rely on digital cash support to purchase what little supplies are left, leaving those with less resources at higher risk of food insecurity. The situation has also pushed some families to adopt potentially harmful coping mechanisms, including eating animal feed and food scraps to survive (WFP 05/08/2025). Given the current insecurity and widespread violence, the food security situation is likely to further deteriorate until a cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access is allowed.

DRIVERS

Territorial control over Darfur. Since 2023, RSF and SAF have been contesting control over Darfur, particularly Al Fasher, SAF's last major military stronghold in North Darfur. Al Fasher was previously SAF's central command and logistical hub in Darfur, from which it coordinated operations, managed supply lines, and maintained a presence across western Sudan. Prior to the capture of the city, RSF had besieged Al Fasher for 18 months, trapping civilians amid worsening humanitarian conditions, such as famine conditions and the spread of diseases (ACLED 29/10/2025; CFR 06/11/2025). Although SAF and allied armed groups controlled Al Fasher, RSF tightly controlled the remaining territory in Darfur and held ambitions to secure all strategic territory in the region, including Al Fasher. The recent escalation of violence in Al Fasher coincided with RSF's establishment of a parallel administration headquartered in Nyala, South Darfur (AJ 26/07/2025; Sudan Times 04/09/2025). The establishment of this parallel administration accelerated RSF's ambitions to capture Al Fasher and assert control over the whole Darfur region, where it is domiciled (AJ 29/10/2025; HORN IISS 29/10/2025).

COMPOUNDING FACTORS

Humanitarian crisis in Tawila

IDPs from Al Fasher arrive not only from a location where they were at heightened risk of multiple unmet needs but also to communities with overwhelming and unmet needs. Even before the 26 October 2025 escalation in Al Fasher, Tawila was already hosting the highest number of IDPs (over 650,000) among all localities of Sudan, which nearly tripled between March–September. Tawila has been taking in the people displaced from Al Fasher and the wider Darfur region (SAPA 10/11/2025).

Most live in gathering sites or informal settlements under difficult conditions, with around 74% of the displaced living in informal settlements lacking proper infrastructure and fewer than 10% of displaced households having consistent access to safe water or sanitation – well below Sphere standards (SAPA 10/11/2025). Healthcare access is also severely strained, with 70% of households reporting a need for medical care in the past three months and half of them unable to receive treatment. Access to food is also a challenge, with 86% having either borderline or poor food consumption levels in September (IOM 29/10/2025). The displaced population in Tawila is projected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse conditions until May 2026, with 75% facing these severe conditions. Within this group, 40% are in IPC 3, 30% in IPC 4, and 5% in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), indicating projected very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality (IPC 03/11/2025).

Until 27 October, the available humanitarian response provided only about 50% of the basic needs of the people in Tawila; with thousands of newly displaced people arriving from Al Fasher, the current situation is likely to further strain these already limited resources and constrain service provision even more (IRC 27/10/2025).

RSF's campaign, culminating in the capture of Al Fasher, is fundamentally sustained by the illicit gold trade, granting RSF a massive financial advantage over SAF. RSF control over major gold-producing regions, particularly in Darfur, allows it to smuggle billions of dollars' worth of 'conflict gold' primarily through regional networks and to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which serves as a major export and refining hub (The Sentry 02/10/2025; Chatham House 26/03/2025). This self-funding mechanism enables RSF to procure a steady supply of weapons and drones and recruit fighters, directly prolonging and intensifying the conflict (Genocide Watch 11/12/2024). The economic competition to dominate these gold assets and smuggling corridors, especially those running through strategic locations such as Al Fasher, has resulted in the systematic denial of humanitarian access, aid blockade, and widespread civilian infrastructure destruction, altogether aggravating food insecurity conditions (African Arguments 10/11/2025).

Communication disruptions

Communication disruptions resulting from the RSF capturing Starlink devices and mobile phones during the takeover prevent civilians from contacting family members (UNHCR 28/10/2025; Dabanga 30/10/2025; EEPA 10/11/2025).

The digital sphere has emerged as a site of both propaganda and misinformation, amplifying the humanitarian crisis. Platforms such as TikTok have been used to share the violence committed by RSF, with RSF fighters publicly admitting to killings and using social media to seemingly celebrate atrocities. Concurrently, numerous AI-generated or out-of-context images and videos have circulated widely. The exploitation of the infodemic is understood to be part of RSF's attempts to conceal the atrocities committed in Al Fasher, used alongside other measures, such as the reported burning of bodies and the use of mass graves to cover up evidence of mass killings (Beam Reports 29/10/2025 and 30/10/2025; AJ YouTube 04/11/2025). This is understood to be part of attempts by RSF and The Sudan Founding Alliance, the political arm of RSF, to conceal the atrocities committed in Al Fasher. These efforts also include the reported burning of bodies and the use of mass graves to cover up evidence of mass killings (AJ 09/11/2025; YSPH HRL 04/11/2025). RSF-affiliated parties have also sought to control the narrative surrounding events in the city by selectively granting media access to purportedly sympathetic outlets. For instance, they permitted a UAE-linked news agency, to report from Al Fasher. This access has coincided with the banning of the same news agency from operating in SAF-controlled areas (BBC 11/11/2025; MEE 10/11/2025; Sudan Horizon 10/11/2025; The Telegraph 14/11/2025). Media reports indicate that individuals –and bots- affiliated with the UAE are engaging in online messaging directed at civilians in Sudan (MEE Youtube 06/11/2025). This highlights the politicisation of media access and information control in the conflict.

The dissemination of misleading content has undermined the credibility of authentic documentation, facilitated the spread of disinformation, and provided perpetrators with mechanisms to evade accountability. The result is a digital environment that normalises violence, potentially impedes justice, and erodes public confidence in verified human rights reporting (Beam Reports 29/10/2025 and 30/10/2025). Moreso, RSF detaining journalists in Al Fasher, who face threats to their safety, further strains the information landscape (Dabanga 05/11/2025).

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND CONSTRAINTS

Constant and consistent bombardment over the last few months has destroyed both public and private infrastructure, including hospitals, creating a difficult response environment even before the takeover (The Guardian 15/10/2025).

While security threats heavily restrict access to Al Fasher, humanitarian responders are present in the areas surrounding the town and the locations where people are fleeing to, including Tawila and Korma (located between Tawila and Al Fasher), where reception sites help stabilise critically ill and injured people and facilitate transfers to Tawila (MSF 27/10/2025; WHO 29/10/2025). Health responders are adjusting their modalities to shift, when and where possible, to mobile response and the trucking of essential health supplies to affected areas (WHO 29/10/2025). Protection responders are providing services to address the effects of the conflict, including case management, psychosocial support services, mine action awareness, GBV awareness, and support to UASC (UNICEF 06/11/2025).

In Tawila, where most people fleeing Al Fasher are displaced to, humanitarian needs are overwhelming response capabilities (PI 30/10/2025).

The disruption of communication networks following the takeover and road access challenges, both resulting from insecurity and other access difficulties, have created an operational vacuum for humanitarian operations (Saferworld 03/11/2025; IOM 11/11/2025). The limited information landscape makes it extremely challenging for aid organisations to verify urgent needs, coordinate effective aid delivery, or accurately track displaced populations (UN Women 31/10/2025).

Map 1. Localities of IDPs displaced from Al Fasher town and surrounding villages



Source: IOM (11/11/2025)

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